Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why "Rights" Don't Matter W. Wesley Pue p. 4 of 22 November 8, 2007 ----- perpetrated by pirates, anyone seeking to "read" the movie against contemporary circumstances cannot fail to register, powerfully, the real pain inflicted by terrorists.
Images of airliners being flown into office towers, nightclub bombings in Bali, and attacks on railways, buses or subways in Spain, Mumbai, or London are seared into twentieth century western consciousness. The fear that dirty nuclear devices, chemical or biological weapons might be unleashed on major cities in order to wreak damage and death on an unprecedented scale cannot be ignored. Such things will happen.
Confronted with the spectre of real terror, death, and destruction, and of real enemies quite unlike the playful pirates of fiction, most contemporaries are willing to trade a little freedom for a little security. In the world of realpolitik, terrorist threats must be taken seriously. Niceties such as the "right to counsel," "habeas corpus," privacy, or trial by jury, acquire an abstract character. Nice if you can have them, these lawyers' obsessions seem less important than life, property, or democracy: second order priorities, or luxuries perhaps.
But, is it lawyers' obsessions that are at issue?
So conceiving things misconstrues, seriously. The linguistic usages of lawyers have taken over much public discourse during the past half-century. Curiously, this has narrowed the range of consideration on immensely important public matters and blunted critique of even draconian laws. In most liberal democracies discussions of the virtues of this or that "anti-terrorism" law have been cast in terms familiar to legalistic minded civil libertarians. The critique of anti-terrorism law has most often been championed by professionals whose detailed knowledge and focused critiques, as often as not, serve to confound. By focusing too much on particulars, larger shifts in the way power operates under the guise of the "War on Terror" is obscured.
Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why "Rights" Don't Matter W. Wesley Pue p. 5 of 22 November 8, 2007 ----- In this brief commentary, I hope to avoid confusing the trees for the wood, by taking the discussion of contemporary anti-terrorism law 3 to a level somewhat above the forest canopy, to a point from whence the full contours of the forest can be perceived, its breadth, depth, and height discerned. I hope to draw upon the perspective so attained in order to reveal a surprising truth. The violation of "rights", at least as we now understand that notion, forms a surprisingly small portion of what is wrong with "Anti-Terrorism" legislation in major western countries. Consequently, the presence or absence of constitutionally entrenched "rights" protections ("Charters," "Bills," or "Human Rights" legislation) determines only a small degree of the variance of outcomes when draconian state powers are subjected to judicial review. In substantiating this second point, it is necessary to attain a bird's-eye view of Anti-Terrorist law, but also to engage in some realism about constitutionally entrenched rights. One final point bears emphasis, though
it cannot be developed in this essay: only the tiniest sliver of state action is ever subjected to judicial review. This gives any discussion of what happens in the courts a somewhat abstract, other-worldly character, grotesquely distanced from the quotidian routine in which subjects' encounter state authority.
Bird's Eye View: Anti-Terrorism Law & the Principle of Legality
In his classic work, The Morality of Law, 4 Lon Fuller offers a compelling account of the minimum conditions of legality. Much, it turns out, follows from the simple proposition that law serves to guide human conduct by means of rules. Fuller illustrates his understanding of law through an extended parable concerning a bumbling but wellmeaning "King Rex," who makes a complete hash of governance because he is unable to appreciate the virtue and nature of law. "Eight routes to disaster" emerge from Rex's 1. A failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis; 2. A failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe; 3. The abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; 4. A failure to make rules understandable; 5. The enactment of contradictory rules; 6. Rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 7. Introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; 8. A failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration.
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Fuller's desiderata are widely considered to embody the essence of the rule of law. Few could argue against the virtue of generality, promulgation, prospectivity, clarity, absence of contradictions, performability, constancy over time, or congruence of rules with actions.
6
Casual observers of contemporary legal systems can be forgiven for thinking it unlikely that any of these "routes to disaster" can be present in notoriously law-bounded modern democracies. Anyone who has ploughed through the mind-numbingly complex, elaborated, voluminous, legislation that emerged from Western legislatures in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, would be forgiven for thinking it unlikely that failure to achieve rules -the first "route to disaster" -could be at issue. Moreover, it seems entirely obvious that blowing up office buildings, trains, buses, and so on should be illegal. This, along with massive media attention on the "War on Terror" makes it seem, at first glance, that none of routes 2, 4, 6 or 7 (failure to publicize; incomprehensible rules; impossible-to-obey rules; unstable law) can be of concern. It would be logical to think that there can hardly be any question of one law authorizing what another prohibits when it comes to terrorism. Hence, the fifth disaster route, "contradictory rules", seems
Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why "Rights" Don't Matter W. Wesley Pue p. 7 of 22 November 8, 2007 ----- unlikely. Similarly, the third route to disaster, retroactivity, seems an unlikely reef on which anti-terrorism law might flounder. Indeed, it is commonly asserted that much antiterrorism law only prohibits things which were previously illegal (killing civilians, conspiring to do so, etc.). Finally, given the paramount importance of preventing terrorist attacks, one would think state authorities at all levels would be determined to ensure congruence between anti-terrorism rules and state action: the eighth disaster route seems unlikely.
Closer inspection overturns each assumption. The very complexity of antiterrorism statutes, which seemingly inoculates against failure to achieve rules (disaster route #1), is our first clue. If we take Canada's Anti-Terrorism legislation 7 as representative of the genus, surprising results begin to emerge. The deeper one probes the language, structure, and workings of anti-terrorism law, the more clear it becomes that each and every one of Fuller's eight routes to disaster is violated. As is commonly the case in human endeavour, the road to disaster is paved with good intent. Unfortunate consequences arise from the desire to "name" global terrorism as a distinct category of criminal activity, from the intent to disrupt terrorist organizations (rather than merely prosecute criminal activities after the fact), and from the desire to draft legislation so as to ensure that no future terrorist can ever shelter in legal loopholes.
Anyone who has given the matter any thought knows the difficulty of giving precise definition to "terrorism." The term is invoked for its rhetorical power and denunciatory effect rather than analytical coherence. "Terrorist" actions are invariably prohibited under ordinary criminal prohibitions on violence, intimidation, or extortion. It is a crime to deliberately blow people up, with our without special "anti-terrorism" laws.
So too, conspiracies to do such things, aiding and abetting individuals doing them, and so on, are criminal under ordinary law. It may be that "anti-terrorism" gives emphasis to the denunciation of all non-state violence, bolstering the moral power of law, perhaps. "Bizarrely, knowing facilitation can happen even though no terrorist activity was in fact carried out, where the "facilitator" does not know "that a particular activity is facilitated," and where no particular terrorist activity was foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated."
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Though learned judges are capable of "reading down" facilitation provisions so as to render them both intelligible and, perhaps, tolerable, the statutory language is extraordinarily, unnecessarily, imprecise. It is hard to know which of Fuller's requirements of legality is left inviolate in such statutory schemes. A system founded, at every critical juncture, on official discretion fails to achieve rules at all: the first and essential requirement of legality is absent. "Umpire's Discretion" prevails.
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Rights Don't Matter
This perspective is obtainable only from a bird's eye view. It is as hard to discern from 30,000 feet as it is from ground level.
Too distanced a perspective dulls perception, leading to jingoistic, utterly illogical, defences of the statutory scheme. Prime examples of jingoism include the surprisingly common assumption that the Act passes muster either because "Canada is a 8, 2007 ----- pretty decent country" or because it lacks one or more offensive provisions found in similar legislation elsewhere (the USA PATRIOT Act is a favorite whipping boy, here).
Others, displaying stunning capacity for non sequitur, conclude that otherwise objectionable laws are acceptable because "our political leaders are trustworthy" or "our security personnel are well-meaning."
Conversely, viewing the matter from a position too close to the ground of criminal law practice or "constitutional" law doctrine obscures the larger story. The particular camouflages the general; the wood is lost for the trees.
A sloppy habit of thought that common lawyers have fallen prey to during the past half-century compounds the problems of perceptions dimmed by complacency on the one hand or too intense a focus on detail on the other. We have become inured to a degree of imprecision in statutory drafting that routinely far exceeds the requirements of pragmatic governance, much less the requirements of the rule of law.
I do not wish to be understood as implying that the many specific objections to Here lies the rub, however.
The formal theory of the thing apart, the "bindingness" of constitutionally entrenched rights is a good deal less certain than is often thought. This is not because we presume bad faith on the part of officials or judges. Nor is it only because some courts are, as Mr. Barns' suggests, more inclined to "capital-C conservatism" than others.
The inherent ambiguity of language intrudes powerfully, destabilizing the content of even the most "certain" rights. Section 2 of the Canadian Charter, for example, protects the "fundamental freedoms" of "thought, belief, opinion and expression," along with freedom of "conscience and religion", "peaceful assembly", and "association" for " 8, 2007 ----- and the freedom of peaceful assembly is violated by state authorities with surprising regularity.
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Other rights are explicitly qualified even in their utterance. Thus, deprivation of "life, liberty and security of the person" is entirely allowable under the terms of Canada's Charter provided it is done "in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice"
and it is only "unreasonable search or seizure" and arbitrary detention and imprisonment that is prohibited (Charter sections 7, 8, and 9, respectively). The point is neither that these words are meaningless nor that judges, officials, and law-makers fail to take them earnestly to heart on a daily basis. They are not, however, unambiguous, not absolute and, as words on paper, can never be self-enacting. These conditions apply to all constitutionally entrenched rights, everywhere, even if no further words of explicit limitation are found. 24 It is naïve to hope for too much in the way of certainty merely because a statement of rights has been constitutionally entrenched. Lawyers love the ambiguity of language and, always, can make much of it.
All of this provides considerable grist for the lawyers' mill, of course. What effect it has on channeling Anti-Terrorism law along more, rather than less, desirable courses is less clear. The necessary imprecision of language leaves any marginally competent lawyer enormous room to maneuver, an effect accentuated in times of crisis or perceived crisis. As a result, the presence or absence of constitutionally entrenched "rights" protections ("Charters," "Bills," or "Human Rights" legislation) determines only a small degree of the variance of outcomes when harsh or extraordinary state powers come to judicial review. invoked in public discourse, and rights issues enter into public consciousness in a different way than they do in countries without entrenched "rights protection". When all is said and done, it is not unreasonable to assert, modestly, that the constitutional entrenchment of "rights" can do no harm, and might actually lead to the enhancement of rights.
The Canadian experience of living with both a Charter of Rights and Freedoms
and an overreaching Anti-Terrorism regime, suggests otherwise, I think. There is, at a minimum, reason for caution in this regard. I wish to assert that the presence of a Charter in Canada has distorted public discourse about civil liberties and rights. Recognizing that it is notoriously hard to identify cause and effect in the realm of law and social change, I
do not want to enter into the complexities of the wider field of enquiry that this opens up, nor to assert that the Charter is primarily to blame for any particular evils. My more modest claim is that the quality of rights protection in any given culture, its commitment to the principle of the rule of law, and the substantive outcomes are not "determined" by the presence or absence of a Charter. I do assert that the presence of a Charter in Canada has co-existed with a diminution in the quality of public discourse and that specific, identifiable, features of Charter politics and Charter law tugs in this direction. I would not wish for a moment, however, to suggest that other factors are not in play, nor that the Charter is the causa causans in any of this. Others, no doubt, would point to declining union membership or church participation, falling newspaper readership, television's narcotic effect, the decline of political parties, a general dumbing down of politics, consumerism, the evils of public education, "Americanization" of Canadian culture, or the perfection of politics by polling consequent on the publication of Theodore White's Ministers and their most senior advisors to provide cover for the Anti-Terrorism Act.
The Attorney-General of the day defended the legislation on the basis that it had been carefully reviewed by legal experts in the Government's employ, who declared it safe from Charter review. In Orwellian fashion, Ottawa's upper echelons spoke of the Bill as having been so cleverly drafted as to be "Charter-proof". Politics, unlike law, is unconstrained by logic. This declaration was spun effectively to support an altogether different proposition: because the Bill could not be challenged under the Charter it had to be good law. With studied cynicism, the Charter was used to bat away any and all substantial questioning of the constitutional propriety or wisdom of the Bill. "Politics" of the crassest sort, the bar was set very low, deflecting attention entirely from the wisdom of the statute. 33 A focus on Charter compliance as, in effect, the only relevant "rights" concern, says nothing about the way in which police or security officials will use the act, nothing about the likelihood of the bill attaining its desired ends. and nothing about its consonance with Canadian standards of civil liberties, justice, constitutionalism or the rule of law. ) "Such a strategy may deceive a public who thinks that consistency with the Charter means that rights are not infringed … Constitutionalism in Canada before the Charter was built on the notion that those in power should not exercise their legal powers to the fullest extent possible even in times of perceived crisis. It was fundamental to British constitutionalism that what was legal might nevertheless be improper and unconstitutional … we are losing sight of this older sense that power must be restrained by decency, prudence, and tradition, not just the legal limits that lawyers and courts impose on us."
Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why "Rights" Don't Matter W. Wesley Pue p. 17 of 22 November 8, 2007 ----- way, that is remarkably similar to Australia's in key aspects) was the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Narcotic Effect
If the Charter serves to camouflage the unpleasantness of certain laws, it also has a longer-term narcotic effect, numbing citizens to important matters of public governance. It does this over the long term partly in the same way the "Trojan Horse" strategy works in the short-term. Charters, Bills of Rights, and their ilk remove key issues from the domain of informed public debate, "professionalize" rights-talk to an astonishing degree, and segregate matters of rights and liberties from the legitimate ambit of lay knowledge. Democratic governance is eviscerated under such conditions. This disempowering of the citizenry on issues related to liberty works in part because, through the stunning effectiveness of the Trojan trick, "Charter compliance" is offered as proof positive of legislative wisdom, obscuring issues of constitutional propriety lying below the Charter threshold. The trick works only because Charter talk professionalizes, abstracts, removes from politics. 34 Citizens quickly become lost in discussions of section numbers, qualified rights, matters that are "demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society", non obstante clauses, "reading down", and multiple-stage tests. At each point in such discussions the point of particular issues gets lost in a sea of technicality. Even the most simple principles (you shouldn't imprison someone in secret and indefinitely on executive command) is lost sight of.
A Charter can serve to distract attention from what are in fact foundational constitutional questions: who should be able to do what to whom, when, and under which circumstances. These questions are the core of constitutionalism and working them out has been a constant struggle over centuries encompassing at least the period from the Magna Carta to the present. The "working out" has not been exclusively or even principally a matter of the interpretation of written constitutions in any country derived 34 Such outcomes are often welcomed by elected officials, who can conveniently avoid their responsibilities by fobbing tough questions off on the Courts. McNamara aptly observes that "A feature of the Canadian model as it has taken shape, that may have been unanticipated in 1982, is the tendency for the Charter to be regarded as a tool of the judiciary, and for litigation to be seen as the default strategy of Charter engagement. As a result, governments have not always been proactive in fulfilling their own obligations to advance human rights goals." (op. cit., at 255) Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why "Rights" Don't Matter W. Wesley Pue p. 18 of 22 November 8, 2007 ----- from a Westminster model of governance (including the USA) 35 . Though much disparaged by scholars for a half-century or more, the "rule of law' remains the sine qua non of constitutional governance. Bizarrely, the Canadian experience, with rare exception, has been to focus critique on this or that "Charter" violation to such a degree as to miss entirely the massively undefined and largely secret powers vested in officials under the rubric of the "War on Terror". This is the 800 pound gorilla in the room. The violation of "rights", at least as we now understand that notion, forms a surprisingly small portion of what is wrong with "Anti-Terrorism" legislation.
Space precludes a full exploration of these themes, but one recent case serves to Long-standing principles of statutory interpretation -each designed to project freedomsuch as that criminal statutes should be strictly construed, that ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the accused, that the legislature should be presumed to intend minimal infringement of liberty and, conversely, be explicit as to its liberty-infringing intent, and so on. Such principles have been diminished in application in Canada during the period in which all attention has focused on the "Charter" as the most important vehicle for protecting rights. 35 The real "activist judges" in both Canada and Australia were able to protect rights rather vigorously during the immediate post-World War II years by drawing on British Constitutional tradition in articulating a sort of implied Bill of Rights appended to federalism in each country. 36 R. v. Khawaja,[2006] O.J. No. 4245 ["Khawaja"] 37 Ibid., para 3.
Protecting Constitutionalism in Treacherous Times: Why "Rights" Don't Matter W. Wesley Pue p. 19 of 22 November 8, 2007 ----- The allegation of over-breadth in Khawaja provides a stunning illustration of how ineffective "rights protections" can be in a Charter regime. Mr. Justice Rutherford concluded that the impugned provisions were neither overbroad nor void for vagueness because "they can be read, construed and applied in conformity with the principles of fundamental justice" 38 [i.e., in a fashion that rendered them constitutionally acceptable].
His Lordship's ruling is carefully reasoned and seemingly in conformity with the law as established by the Supreme Court of Canada in these respects. What is interesting about the reasoning offered in Khawaja and the result reached is not any error on the part of the deciding judge, but the shocking possibility that he may be absolutely correct. Even the causal observer will note the glaring illogic of the approach taken: the fact that a Superior
Court Judge who has enjoyed the luxury of time to reflect and the benefit of learned submissions of counsel is capable of "reading", "construing" and "applying" vague or broad words in a lawful fashion rather begs the more important question of how the law serves to guide citizens and state officials alike. Statutory language that is only rendered lawful after it is interpreted in court violates almost every principle of legality that frustrated the blundering King Rex in Lon Fuller's fable: the police officer is likely to misconstrue the extent of her power; the citizen to suffer accordingly. A modicum of realism suggests that lawful state conduct requires clarity in statutory drafting, not the sort of ex post facto rationalization that reading down permits.
On the vagueness arm of the ruling, his Lordship noted the rule of law rationale for proscribing vague laws, citing authority to the effect that "A citizen is not to be deprived of liberty under a law that is vague" 39 . The rub comes, however, not because of a failure to recognize the importance of principles relating to liberty, but because of how they have been translated into constitutional practice by the Canadian Courts. The Supreme Court of Canada has fallen into habits of extreme "deference" to the legislature, to such an extent that it requires almost nothing back in terms of clarity of statutory drafting. Its doctrines relating to "void for vagueness" fatally compromise the principle so much that Peter Hogg, the "dean" of Canadian constitutional law experts has said that 38 Ibid., Para 6. 39 Ibid., Para. 16. 17 The degree of precision required in our laws is not, however, to lay out a prescription such that one can predict with certainty the outcome of all conceivable factual situations. There are not enough draftspersons to accomplish anything like that; and who could read the volumes that would be required? A framework delineating the area of risk is what is required. The standard was described in Canada v. Pharmaceutical Society (Nova Scotia) , [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 (S.C.C.) by Gonthier J. at 638-9 in these terms.
Legal rules only provide a framework, a guide as to how one may behave, but certainty is only reached in instant cases, where law is actualized by a competent authority. In the meanwhile, conduct is guided by approximation. The process of approximation sometimes results in quite a narrow set of options, sometimes in a broader one. Legal dispositions therefore delineate a risk zone, and cannot hope to do more, unless they are directed at individual instances.
By setting out the boundaries of permissible and non-permissible conduct, these norms give rise to legal debate. They bear substance, and they allow for a discussion as to their actualization. They therefore limit enforcement discretion by introducing boundaries, and they also sufficiently delineate an area of risk to allow for substantive notice to citizens.
Indeed, no higher requirement as to certainty can be imposed on law in our modern state. Semantic arguments, based on a perception of language as an unequivocal medium, are unrealistic. Language is not the exact tool some may think it is. It cannot be argued that an enactment can and must provide enough guidance to predict the legal consequences of any given course of conduct in advance. All it can do is enunciate some boundaries, which create an area of risk. But it is inherent to our legal system that some conduct will fall along the boundaries of the area of risk; no definite prediction can then be made. Guidance, not direction, of conduct is a more realistic objective.
[emphasis added by Mr. Justice Rutherford] 18 I am not persuaded that the provisions in question are vague to the point of being unconstitutional They describe conduct in a fashion that provides notice of what is prohibited and set an intelligible standard for both citizen and law enforcement officials. The fact that we were able to debate the potential 40 Ribeiro, supra note 6 at 4. The Charter has not significantly affected the substance of Canada's AntiTerrorism legislation. It may have diverted attention from the main play, sidelined concerned citizens from active participation in debate and mystified members of the public as to the issues raised by that legislative package.
"Rights" matter little if official discretion buttressed by overbroad legislation cast in the vaguest possible terms substitutes for governance in accordance with intelligible legal rules. Lord Cutler Beckett would be pleased.
42 Khawaja, para 62.
